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FINITELY ADDITIVE BELIEFS AND UNIVERSAL TYPE SPACES1
BY MARTIN MEIER
Instituto de Análisis Económico, CSIC
The probabilistic type spaces in the sense of Harsanyi [Management Sci.
14 (1967/68) 159–182, 320–334, 486–502] are the prevalent models used to
describe interactive uncertainty. In this paper we examine the existence of a
universal type space when beliefs are described by finitely additive proba-
bility measures. We find that in the category of all type spaces that satisfy
certain measurability conditions (κ-measurability, for some fixed regular car-
dinal κ), there is a universal type space (i.e., a terminal object) to which every
type space can be mapped in a unique beliefs-preserving way. However, by
a probabilistic adaption of the elegant sober-drunk example of Heifetz and
Samet [Games Econom. Behav. 22 (1998) 260–273] we show that if all sub-
sets of the spaces are required to be measurable, then there is no universal
type space.
1. Introduction. Consider players that are uncertain about a set S, called the
space of states of nature, each element of which can be thought of as a complete list
of the players’ strategy sets and payoff functions, that is, a complete specification
of the “rules” of the game that depend on the state of nature. (Other interpreta-
tions are also possible. For example, if a game of complete information is given,
a state s ∈ S could be the strategy profile that the players are actually going to
choose; see the analysis of epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium by Aumann
and Brandenburger [1].) In such a situation, following a Bayesian approach, each
player will base his choice of a strategy on his subjective beliefs (i.e., a probability
measure) on S. Since a player’s payoff depends also on the choices of the other
players, and these are based on their beliefs as well, each player must also have
beliefs on the other players’ beliefs on S. For the same reason, he must also have
beliefs on other players’ beliefs on his beliefs on S, beliefs on other players’ beliefs
on his beliefs on their beliefs on S, and so on. So, in analyzing such a situation, it
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seems to be unavoidable to work with infinite hierarchies of beliefs. Thus, the re-
sulting model is complicated and cumbersome to handle. In fact, this was the issue
that prevented for a long time the analysis of games of incomplete information.
A major breakthrough took place with three articles of Harsanyi [5], where he
succeeded in finding another, more workable model to describe interactive uncer-
tainty. He invented the notions of type and type space: With each point in a type
space, called a state of the world, are associated a state of nature and, for each
player, a probability measure on the type space itself (i.e., that player’s type in this
state of the world). Usually it is assumed that the players “know their own type,”
that is, a type of a player in a state assigns probability 1 to the set of those states
where this player is of this type. This is the formalization of the idea that the play-
ers should be self-conscious. Since each state of the world is associated with a state
of nature, each player’s type in a state of the world induces a probability measure
on S. But also, since with each state of the world there is associated a type for
each player (and hence indirectly a probability measure on S for this player), the
type of a player in a state of the world induces a probability measure on the other
players’ probability measures on S. Proceeding like this, one obtains in each state
of the world a hierarchy of beliefs for each player, in the sense described above.
The advantages of Harsanyi’s model are obvious: Since we have in each state
of the world just one probability measure for each player, contrary to the hierar-
chical description of beliefs, this model fits in the classical Bayesian framework
of describing beliefs by one probability measure, and provides therefore all its
advantages (e.g., it allows for integration with respect to beliefs).
However, there are also several serious questions that arise with the use of this
model: Although each state of the world in a type space induces a hierarchy of be-
liefs for each player, the converse is not obvious: Does each profile of hierarchies
of beliefs arise from a state of the world in some type space, and if so, is there a
type space such that every profile of belief hierarchies is generated by some state
in this type space? What “are” the states of the world, and what justifies using
one particular type space and not another? In particular, contrary to the case of the
hierarchical description of beliefs, it is not clear what “all possible types” (resp.
“all possible states of the world”) are. More precisely, given a game of incomplete
information, working in one fixed type space to analyze that game could be restric-
tive in the sense that we might miss some possible types (resp. possible states of
the world) that are just present in a bigger type space that contains the one we use.
If this were the case for every type space, then the use of type spaces would be
problematic from a theoretical point of view, because of the restrictive character of
this concept, but it would be problematic also from a more practical point of view:
In their contributions to the debate on epistemic conditions for backward induc-
tion in perfect information games, Stalnaker [16] and Battigalli and Siniscalchi [2]
have pointed out that the players do “their best” to rationalize their opponents’ be-
havior if the backward-induction outcome is to obtain. This translates into using a
388 M. MEIER
type space where a player can find the needed types he has to attribute to the other
players, if he has to explain (i.e., rationalize) the others’ behavior.
The question concerning “all possible types” can be answered and the related
problems can be solved if there is a type space to which every type space (on the
same space of states of nature and for the same set of players, of course) can be
mapped, preferably always in a unique way, by a map that preserves the structure of
the type space, that is, the manner in which types and states of nature are associated
with states of the world, a so-called type morphisms. Such a type space would be
called a universal type space. If such a space always exists, one could, in principle,
carry out the analysis of a game of incomplete information in the corresponding
universal type space without any risk of missing a relevant state of the world. On
a technical level, the type spaces—on a fixed set of states of nature and for a fixed
player set—as objects and the type morphisms as morphisms form a category. If we
always require the map from a type space to the universal type space to be unique,
then, if it exists, such a universal type space is a terminal object of this category.
A terminal object of a category is known to be unique up to isomorphism. Hence,
we are justified to talk about the universal type space.
The existence of a universal type space was proved by Mertens and Zamir [14]
under the assumption that the underlying space of states of nature is a compact
Hausdorff space and all involved functions are continuous. That topological as-
sumption was relaxed by Brandenburger and Dekel [3], Heifetz [6] and Mertens,
Sorin and Zamir [13] to more general topological assumptions. Finally, the gen-
eral measure-theoretic case was solved by Heifetz and Samet [10], who showed
that there also exists a universal type space in this case. However, in all these arti-
cles it has always been assumed that the players’ beliefs are σ -additive. This seems
to be a rather strong assumption on the epistemic attitudes of the players.
Savage’s postulates [15] imply subjective probabilities that are finitely but not
countably additive. Given the importance of Savage’s theory within decision the-
ory (i.e., “one-player game theory”), it is natural to ask—and desirable to know—
what happens if we describe the beliefs of players accordingly in an interactive
context (games) by finitely additive probability measures? Does there still exist a
universal type space?
Still, we are dealing with (now finitely additive) measures, so we have to define
a field of events. The question arises as to which measurability condition is the
right one. Should the field of events be just a field, a σ -field or should we assume
that all subsets of the space of states of the world are events, that is, that the field is
simply the power set? As this question does not seem to have a clear-cut answer, we
analyze the existence/nonexistence of a universal type space for finitely additive
beliefs for a whole class of different measurability conditions that include the three
above-mentioned cases.
We introduce κ-fields, where κ is an (usually regular) infinite cardinal number,
as fields that are closed under the intersection of every set of events (i.e., subset of
the field) that has cardinality strictly less than κ . It follows that ℵ0-fields are fields
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in the usual sense and ℵ1-fields are σ -fields in the usual sense. Then, we define
∞-fields as fields that are closed under the intersection of every set of events (of
cardinality whatsoever).
We define κ-type spaces as type spaces where the set of measurable events in
the set of states of the world, as well as the set of measurable events in the set
of states of nature, is a κ-field, and ∞-type spaces as type spaces where the set of
measurable events in the set of states of nature is the full power set and the set of
measurable events in the set of states of the world is a ∞-field. Also, we define
∗-type spaces as type spaces where the set of measurable events in the set of states
of the world as well as the set of measurable events in the set of states of nature
is the full power set. Furthermore, we define type morphisms, that is, structure-
preserving maps from one κ-type space (resp. ∞-type space or ∗-type space) to
another (not necessarily different) one.
Given a nonempty set of players I , a nonempty set of states of nature S and
a κ-field S on S, we define, similar to Heifetz and Samet [10], a kind of modal
language, the formulas of which we call κ-expressions. But if κ is uncount-
able, contrary to Heifetz and Samet [10], we allow also for formulas of infinite
length (but strictly less than κ). Then, we collect the κ-descriptions (by means of
κ-expressions) of all states of the world in all κ-type spaces on S for player set I .
Then we show that the set of κ-descriptions can be endowed with the structure of
a κ-type space (Proposition 4). In this way, we construct in Section 4 a universal
κ-type space on S for player set I to which every κ-type space on S for player
set I can be mapped by a unique type morphism (Theorem 1).
As Heifetz [7] has shown, there are consistent hierarchies of finitely additive (in
fact even σ -additive) beliefs up to—but excluding—level ω (i.e., the first infinite
level), that have at least two different finitely additive extensions to level ω. Does a
similar phenomenon hold also on the higher transfinite levels of consistent hierar-
chies? Or, put differently in terms of expressions rather than hierarchies, is there,
on the contrary, a regular cardinal κ̂ such that for all (regular) cardinals κ > κ̂ , the
κ̂-description of a state in a κ-type space determines already the κ-description? If
this were the case, it would be unnecessary to consider κ-type spaces for κ > κ̂
and we could restrict ourselves to κ-type spaces for κ ≤ κ̂ . We show in Theo-
rem 3, by using a probabilistic adaptation of the “sober-drunk” example of Heifetz
and Samet [9], that—with at least two players and two states of nature—this is
not the case. Hence, it makes sense to consider κ-type spaces for every (regular)
infinite cardinal κ .
Also, this example implies that—again, with at least two players and two states
of nature—there is no universal ∞-type space and no universal ∗-type space (The-
orem 4 and Corollary 1), even if we do not require the morphisms from the type
spaces to the universal type space to be unique.
2. Preliminaries. First, we will define κ-measurable spaces, where κ denotes
here an (usually regular) infinite cardinal number. For an introduction to ordinal
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and cardinal numbers, see [4] or any other textbook on set theory. Then, we will
develop parts of the theory of κ-measurable spaces needed in the sequel, collect
some known facts about finitely additive (probability) measures and define the
main objects of our study in this paper, the κ-, ∞- and ∗-type spaces.
An infinite cardinal number κ is called regular, if it is not the supremum of a
set of less than κ-many ordinal numbers which are all strictly smaller than κ . For
example, ℵ0 and all the ℵα+1 are regular, while ℵω is singular (i.e., infinite and
not regular) (ℵω = sup{ℵn|n < ω}), where ω denotes here the first infinite ordinal
number. For a set M , denote by |M| the cardinality of M .
Unless otherwise stated, α,β, γ, ζ, η, ξ denote ordinal numbers, δ delta-
measures, θ functions from the set of states of the world to the set of states of
nature, κ cardinal numbers, λ limit ordinal numbers, µ and ν measures, π pro-
jections, ϕ,χ,ψ expressions and ω, apart from above, sets of expressions. For a
set M , Pow(M) denotes the set of all subsets of M , that is, the power set.
Let κ be an infinite cardinal number and M a nonempty set. A κ-field on M is a
field  on M such that E ⊆  and |E | < κ imply ⋂E :=⋂E∈E E ∈ . It follows
that E ⊆  and |E | < κ imply ⋃E :=⋃E∈E E ∈ .
Consequently, a κ-measurable space is a pair (M,), where M is a nonempty
set and  is a κ-field on M .
A set of subsets of a nonempty set is a ℵ0-field iff it is a field and it is a ℵ1-field
iff it is a σ -field. If κ ′ < κ , then every κ-field is also a κ ′-field.
REMARK 1. Let κ be a singular cardinal number and (M,) be a κ-measu-
rable space. Then  is already a κ+-field, where κ+ denotes the successor cardi-
nal of κ .
PROOF. Let E ⊆ such that |E |≤ κ . So, E has the form {Eα|α < κ}. Let
κ̂ < κ be the cofinality of κ . Then there is a function f : κ̂ → κ , such that⋃
β<κ̂ f (β) = κ . Note that |f (β)| < κ , for β < κ̂ . It follows that
⋂
α<κ Eα =⋂
β<κ̂(
⋂
α<f (β) Eα) ∈ . Since  is a field, it follows that it is a κ+-field. 
Since κ+ is always regular, the above remark shows that it is redundant to con-
sider κ-fields (κ-measurable spaces, resp.) if κ is a singular cardinal.
Let M be a nonempty set. A ∞-field on M is a field  on M such that E ⊆
 implies
⋂
E := ⋂E∈E E ∈ . Again, it follows that E ⊆  implies ⋃E :=⋃
E∈E E ∈ .
Accordingly, a ∞-measurable space is a pair (M,), where M is a nonempty
set and  is a ∞-field on M .
A ∗-measurable space is a pair (M,Pow(M)), where M is a nonempty set.
Note that every ∗-measurable space is a ∞-measurable space and every
∞-measurable space is a κ-measurable space for every infinite ordinal κ .
A ∞-measurable space (M,) is a ∗-measurable space iff for all m 	= m′ ∈ M
there is an E ∈  such that m ∈ E and m′ /∈ E.
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EXAMPLE 1. Let M = {0,1},  = {∅,M}. (M,) is ∞-measurable, but not
∗-measurable.
DEFINITION 1. Let M be a nonempty set and F a field on M . A finitely
additive measure on (M,F ) is a function µ :F → R ∪ {+∞}, such that:
(i) 0 ≤ µ(F), for all F ∈F ,
(ii) µ(E ∪ F) = µ(E)+µ(F), for all disjoint E,F ∈F .
µ is a finitely additive probability measure on (M,F ), if in addition
(iii) µ(M) = 1.
DEFINITION 2. Let M be a nonempty set,F a field on M , µ a finitely additive
measure on (M,F ), and E ⊆ M .
We define the outer measure of E induced by µ as
µ∗(E) := inf{µ(F)|F ∈F such that E ⊆ F },
and the inner measure of E induced by µ as
µ∗(E) := sup{µ(F)|F ∈F such that F ⊆ E}.
If not stated otherwise, we keep the following.
CONVENTION 1. (i) If (M,) is a κ-measurable space, then κ(M,) de-
notes the space of finitely additive probability measures on (M,). We consider
this space itself as a κ-measurable space endowed with the κ-field κ generated
by all the sets {µ ∈ κ(M,)|µ(E) ≥ p}, where E ∈  and p ∈ [0,1].
(ii) Similarly, we denote by (M,Pow(M)) the set of all finitely additive prob-
ability measures on (M,Pow(M)).
Of course, (i) of this convention depends on the particular κ chosen.
REMARK 2. Let (M ′,′) and (M,) be κ-measurable spaces and let
f :M ′ → M be measurable. Then:
(a) If µ′ is a finitely additive probability measure on (M ′,′), then µ′(f−1(·))
[i.e., µ′(f−1(E)), for E ∈ ] is a finitely additive probability measure on (M,).
(b) If κf :κ(M ′,′) → κ(M,) is defined by κf (µ′) := µ′(f−1(·)), for
µ′ ∈ κ(M ′,′), then κf is measurable, since we have κf (µ′)(E) ≥ p iff
µ′(f−1(E)) ≥ p, for E ∈ .
REMARK 3. Let (M ′,′) and (M,) be κ-measurable spaces and let
f :M ′ → M be measurable and onto. Then:
(a) f−1() := {f−1(E)|E ∈ } is a κ-field on M ′ and a subset of ′.
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(b) If µ is a finitely additive measure on (M,), then µ induces a finitely addi-
tive measure µ′ on (M ′, f−1()) defined by µ′(f−1(E)) := µ(E). Furthermore,
if µ is a finitely additive probability measure, then µ′ is a finitely additive proba-
bility measure.
LEMMA 1. Let γ < α be ordinal numbers. For γ ≤ β < α let (Mβ,F β) be
a ℵ0-measurable space (i.e., Mβ is a nonempty set and F β is a field on Mβ ) and
µβ a finitely additive probability measure on (Mβ,F β), let Mα be a nonempty
set, and for γ ≤ ξ < ζ ≤ α let fξ,ζ :Mζ → Mξ be onto and, if ζ < α, let fξ,ζ be
F ζ −F ξ -measurable, such that:
1. fξ,β ◦ fβ,ζ = fξ,ζ , for all ξ < β < ζ such that γ ≤ ξ < β < ζ ≤ α,
2. µβ(f−1ξ,β (Eξ )) = µξ(Eξ ), for all ξ < β such that γ ≤ ξ < β < α and
all Eξ ∈F ξ .
Then:
(a) ⋃γ≤β<α f−1β,α(F β) is a field on Mα ,
(b) (µβ)γ≤β<α induces a well-defined finitely additive probability measure
µ<α on (Mα,
⋃
γ≤β<α f−1β,α(F β)), defined by µ<α(f−1β,α(Eβ)) := µβ(Eβ), for
Eβ ∈F β .
PROOF. That µ<α is well-defined follows from the above conditions 1 and 2
and the fact that the fβ,α’s are onto. In light of the preceding remark, the rest is
clear. 
NOTATION 1. Let M be a nonempty set, F a field on M , and E ⊆ M . Then
denote by [F ,E] the set of all subsets of M of the form (L∩E)∪ (N ∩ (M \E)),
where L,N ∈F . It is easy to check that [F ,E] is the smallest field that extends F
and contains E as an element.
For further reference, we cite the following two lemmas (in a somewhat dif-
ferent form), which are theorems by Łos´ and Marczewski [12] and Horn and
Tarski [11].
LEMMA 2. Let M be a nonempty set, F a field on M , E ⊆ M , µ a finitely
additive probability measure on (M,F ), µ∗(E) the inner measure of E, µ∗(E)
the outer measure of E, and p a real number such that µ∗(E) ≤ p ≤ µ∗(E).
Then there exists a finitely additive probability measure ν that extends µ to the
field [F ,E] such that ν(E) = p.
PROOF. Follows directly from Theorem 2 of [12]. 
Sometimes, we will refer to the above lemma as the “Łos´–Marczewski theo-
rem.”
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LEMMA 3. Let F1 ⊆F2 be fields on the nonempty set M and let µ be a finitely
additive probability measure on (M,F1). Then there exists an extension of µ to a
finitely additive probability measure ν on (M,F2).
PROOF. Follows from point (i) of Section 4 of [12] and also from [11],
page 477, Theorem 1.21. 
3. Type spaces. For this section, unless otherwise stated, we fix a regular car-
dinal κ . Furthermore we fix a nonempty set of players I , a nonempty set of states of
nature S, and, unless otherwise stated, a κ-field S on S, such that for all s, s′ ∈ S
with s 	= s′ there is an E ∈ S such that s ∈ E and s′ /∈ E.
We define now κ-type spaces, ∞-type spaces and ∗-type spaces, that is, the
objects which we will study in this paper.
DEFINITION 3. A κ-type space on S for player set I is a 4-tuple
M := 〈M,, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉,
where:
(a) M is a nonempty set,
(b)  is a κ-field on M ,
(c) for i ∈ I :Ti is a  − κ -measurable function from M to κ(M,),
the space of finitely additive probability measures on (M,), such that for all
m ∈ M and A ∈  : [Ti(m)] ⊆ A implies Ti(m)(A) = 1, where [Ti(m)] := {m′ ∈
M|Ti(m′) = Ti(m)},
(d) θ is a  −S -measurable function from M to S.
This structure is interpreted as follows: M is the set of states of the world. Such
a state determines completely the objective parameters of the players’ interaction,
that is, the state of the nature θ(m), as well as the players’ beliefs about the true
state of the world. In general, in a state of the world m ∈ M , player i will not know
the true state of the world m; he will just have a probability measure Ti(m) over
the set of states of the world. Ti(m) describes his beliefs in state m, that is, the
type of player i in state m. [Knowing m would mean that Ti(m) = δm, where δ
denotes the Kronecker delta.] θ(m) is the state of nature that corresponds, to the
state of the world m. While there might be many states of the world to which a
given state of nature s ∈ S corresponds, we have that to every state of the world
there corresponds one and only one state of nature. This is expressed by the fact
that θ is a function θ :M → S.
We will refer to the property that for all i ∈ I , m ∈ M and A ∈  : [Ti(m)] ⊆ A
implies Ti(m)(A) = 1, as the introspection property of κ-type spaces (∞-type
spaces and ∗-type spaces, resp., see below). This expresses the self-consciousness
of the players: In a state of the world m a player does not attribute a positive
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probability to states where he has a different belief from the belief he has in the
present state m.
Doing obvious changes, the proofs (of the theorems in this paper) would go
through, if we were to abandon this property; in fact, things would be easier then.
DEFINITION 4. A ∞-type space on S for player set I is a 4-tuple
M := 〈M,, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉,
where:
(a) M is a nonempty set,
(b)  is a ∞-field on M ,
(c) for i ∈ I :Ti is a measurable function from (M,) to ∞(M,), the space
of finitely additive probability measures on (M,), endowed with the ∞-field
generated by all the sets {µ ∈ ∞(M,)|µ(E) ≥ p}, where E ∈  and p ∈ [0,1],
such that for all m ∈ M and A ∈  : [Ti(m)] ⊆ A implies Ti(m)(A) = 1, where
[Ti(m)] := {m′ ∈ M|Ti(m′) = Ti(m)},
(d) θ is a  − Pow(S)-measurable function from M to S.
Note that for µ 	= ν ∈ ∞(M,) there is an E ∈  and a p ∈ [0,1] such that
µ(E) ≥ p and ν(E) < p. This implies that the ∞-field of ∞(M,) is in fact
Pow(∞(M,)), the full power set. Hence, by the measurability of Ti , we have
[Ti(m)] ∈ . So, in fact, the condition that [Ti(m)] ⊆ A implies Ti(m)(A) = 1
reduces to Ti(m)([Ti(m)]) = 1.
By the definitions, it is obvious that every ∞-type space on S is a κ-type space
on S, for every regular κ . [Set S := Pow(S) in the κ-type space.]
DEFINITION 5. A ∗-type space on S for player set I is a 3-tuple
M := 〈M,(Ti)i∈I , θ〉,
where:
(a) M is a nonempty set,
(b) for i ∈ I :Ti is a function from M to (M,Pow(M)), the space of fi-
nitely additive probability measures on (M,Pow(M)), such that for all m ∈
M :Ti(m)([Ti(m)]) = 1, where [Ti(m)] := {m′ ∈ M|Ti(m′) = Ti(m)},
(c) θ is a function from M to S.
Equivalently, a ∗-type space M can be written as M = 〈M,, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉, where
 = Pow(M). So, every ∗-type space on S is a ∞-type space on S. And therefore,
it is also a κ-type space on S.
We define now the beliefs-preserving maps between type spaces.
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DEFINITION 6. Let M ′ = 〈M ′,′, (T ′i )i∈I , θ ′〉 and M = 〈M,, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉
be κ-type spaces (∞-type spaces, ∗-type spaces, resp.) on S for player set I .
A function f :M ′ → M is a type morphism if it satisfies the following condi-
tions:
1. f is ′ −-measurable,
2. for all m′ ∈ M ′:
θ ′(m′) = θ(f (m′)),
3. for all m′ ∈ M ′, E ∈  and i ∈ I :
Ti(f (m
′))(E) = T ′i (m′)(f−1(E)).
Note that the above definition of a type morphism does not depend on κ ; that
is, if κ < κ ′, and M and M ′ are κ ′-type spaces (∞-type spaces, ∗-type spaces,
resp.), then f :M ′ → M is a type morphism from M ′ to M viewed as κ ′-type
spaces (∞-type spaces, ∗-type spaces, resp.) iff it is a type morphism from M ′
to M viewed as κ-type spaces. Similarly, if M ′ and M are ∗-type spaces, then
f :M ′ → M is a type morphism from M ′ to M viewed as ∗-type spaces iff it is a
type morphism from M ′ to M viewed as ∞-type spaces. (Note that in the case of
∗-type spaces, every function f :M ′ → M is measurable.)
DEFINITION 7. A type morphism is a type isomorphism, if it is one-to-one,
onto, and the inverse function is also a type morphism.
It is easy to see that a function f :M ′ → M is a type isomorphism iff it is a type
morphism and isomorphism of the measurable spaces (M ′,′) and (M,).
An easy check shows:
REMARK 4. κ-type spaces on S for player set I (∞-type spaces, ∗-type
spaces, resp.), as objects, and type morphisms, as morphisms, form a category.
DEFINITION 8. (i) A κ-type space  on S for player set I (∞-type space,
∗-type space, resp.) is weak-universal if for every κ-type space M on S for player
set I (∞-type space, ∗-type space, resp.) there is a type morphism from M to .
(ii) A κ-type space  on S for player set I (∞-type space, ∗-type space, resp.)
is universal if for every κ-type space M on S for player set I (∞-type space,
∗-type space, resp.) there is a unique type morphism from M to .
To keep the terms of the already existing type space literature, we use the term
“universal type space,” although in the language of category theory the term “ter-
minal type space” would be more adequate, since the universal type space is a
terminal object in the category of type spaces.
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PROPOSITION 1. If they exist, universal κ-type spaces on S for player set
I (∞-type spaces, ∗-type spaces, resp.) are unique up to type isomorphism.
PROOF. If  and U are universal κ-type spaces (∞-type spaces, ∗-type
spaces, resp.) (on the same space of states of nature and for the same player set,
of course), then there are type morphisms f :U →  and g : → U . It is easy
to check that the composite of two type morphisms is also a type morphism and
that the identity is always a type morphism from a κ-type space  (∞-type space,
∗-type space, resp.) to itself. By the uniqueness, it follows that g ◦ f = idU and
therefore f is one-to-one and g is onto, and f ◦ g = id and therefore g is one-
to-one and f is onto. f and g are type morphisms and f = g−1 and g = f−1.

To prove the existence of a universal κ-type space on S for player set I is the
goal of the next section.
4. The universal κ-type space in terms of expressions. Again, for this sec-
tion, unless otherwise stated, we fix a regular cardinal κ , a nonempty player set I
and a κ-measurable space of states of nature (S,S) such that for all s, s′ ∈ S with
s 	= s′ there is an E ∈ S such that s ∈ E and s′ /∈ E.
Given these data, we define κ-expressions (allowing also for infinite conjunc-
tions) which are natural generalizations of the expressions defined by Heifetz and
Samet [10]. These are formulas that describe events defined solely in terms of na-
ture and the players’ beliefs. Expressions are defined in a similar fashion as, for ex-
ample, the formulas of the probability logic of Heifetz and Mongin [8]. Analogous
to Heifetz and Samet [10], given a κ-type space on S for player set I and a state
of the world in this type space, we define the κ-description of this state as the set
of those κ-expressions that are true in this state of the world. Then, we show that
the set of all κ-descriptions constitutes a κ-type space (Proposition 4) and that this
κ-type space is the universal κ-type space (Theorem 1).
DEFINITION 9. For a κ-type space 〈M,, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉 on S for player set I ,
i ∈ I , E ∈  and p ∈ [0,1] define
B
p
i (E) := {m ∈ M|Ti(m)(E) ≥ p}.
Note that Bpi (E) = T −1i ({µ ∈ κ(M,)|µ(E) ≥ p}) and that Bpi (E) ∈ , if
E ∈ .
DEFINITION 10. Given a κ-measurable space of states of nature (S,S) and
a nonempty player set I , the set κ of κ-expressions is the least set such that:
1. every E ∈ S is a κ-expression,
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2. if ϕ is a κ-expression, then ¬ϕ is a κ-expression,
3. if ϕ is a κ-expression, then Bpi (ϕ) is a κ-expression, for i ∈ I and p ∈ [0,1],
4. if  is a nonempty set of κ-expressions with || < κ , then ∧ϕ∈ ϕ is a
κ-expression.
If  is a nonempty set of κ-expressions with || < κ , then we set ∨ϕ∈ ϕ :=
¬∧ϕ∈ ¬ϕ.
Since we work here with a fixed regular κ , we omit sometimes the superscript κ .
DEFINITION 11. Let M := 〈M,, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉 be a κ-type space on S for
player set I . Define:
1. EM := θ−1(E), for E ∈ S ,
2. (¬ϕ)M := M \ ϕM , for ϕ ∈ κ ,
3. (Bpi (ϕ))M := Bpi (ϕM), for ϕ ∈ κ , i ∈ I and p ∈ [0,1],
4. (
∧
ϕ∈ ϕ)M :=
⋂
ϕ∈ ϕM , for  such that ∅ 	=  ⊆ κ and || < κ .
So, defined as above, κ-expressions define measurable subsets of M . It is easy to
check that (
∨
ϕ∈ ϕ)M :=
⋃
ϕ∈ ϕM , for  such that ∅ 	=  ⊆ κ and || < κ .
If no confusion may arise, we omit—with some abuse of notation—the super-
script M .
DEFINITION 12. For a κ-type space M := 〈M,, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉 on S for player
set I and m ∈ M define Dκ(m), the κ-description of m, as
Dκ(m) := {ϕ ∈ κ |m ∈ ϕM}.
Again, we omit sometimes the superscript κ .
The next proposition says that type morphisms preserve κ-descriptions.
PROPOSITION 2. Let 〈M,, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉 and 〈N,N, (T Ni )i∈I , θN 〉 be κ-type
spaces on S for player set I and let f :M → N be a type morphism. Then, for all
m ∈ M :
D(f (m)) = D(m).
PROOF. We show by induction on the formation of the expressions that m ∈
ϕM iff f (m) ∈ ϕN :
(a) Let E ∈ S . We have θN(f (m)) = θ(m), so f (m) ∈ EN iff m ∈ EM .
(b) We have
f (m) ∈ (¬ϕ)N iff f (m) /∈ ϕN iff m /∈ ϕM iff m ∈ (¬ϕ)M.
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(c) Let  be a nonempty set of expressions with || < κ . Then
f (m) ∈
(∧
ϕ∈
ϕ
)N
iff for all ϕ ∈  :f (m) ∈ ϕN,
which is by the Induction hypothesis the case iff for all ϕ ∈  :m ∈ ϕM , which is
the case iff m ∈ (∧ϕ∈ ϕ)M .
(d) We have
f (m) ∈ (Bpi (ϕ))N iff T Ni (f (m))(ϕN) ≥ p iff Ti(m)(f−1(ϕN)) ≥ p.
By the Induction hypothesis: f−1(ϕN) = ϕM . Hence Ti(m)(f−1(ϕN)) =
Ti(m)(ϕ
M). We have Ti(m)(ϕM) ≥ p iff m ∈ (Bpi (ϕ))M . It follows that
f (m) ∈ (Bpi (ϕ))N iff m ∈ (Bpi (ϕ))M. 
DEFINITION 13. Define κ to be the set of all κ-descriptions of states of the
world in κ-type spaces on S for player set I . For ϕ ∈ κ define
[ϕ] := {ω ∈ κ |ϕ ∈ ω}.
Again, we omit sometimes the superscript κ .
REMARK 5. The set of κ-descriptions κ is nonempty.
PROOF. Let M := {m} and choose s ∈ S. Set  := Pow(M), Ti(m) := δm, for
i ∈ I , and θ(m) := s. Then
〈M,, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉
is a κ-type space (even a ∗-type space) on S for player set I and hence D(m) ∈ κ .

Obviously, we have  \ [ϕ] = [¬ϕ] and ⋂ψ∈[ψ] = [∧ψ∈ ψ], where ϕ is a
κ-expression and  is a nonempty set of κ-expressions with || < κ . It follows
that:
REMARK 6. The set
 := {[ϕ]|ϕ ∈ κ}
is a κ-field on .
LEMMA 4. For every κ-type space M on S for player set I and for every
ϕ ∈ κ , the κ-description map D :M →  satisfies
D−1([ϕ]) = ϕM.
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PROOF. Clear by the definition of [ϕ]. 
Note that Lemma 4 implies that D is measurable.
PROPOSITION 3. For every i ∈ I there exists a function
T ∗i : → κ(,)
such that for every κ-type space M on S for player set I with κ-description map D
and every m ∈ M :
T ∗i (D(m))(·) = Ti(m)(D−1(·)).
PROOF. For ω ∈  choose a κ-type space M on S for player set I and m ∈ M
such that D(m) = ω. For [ϕ] ∈  define
T ∗i (ω)([ϕ]) := Ti(m)(D−1([ϕ])).
We have
Ti(m)(D
−1([ϕ])) = Ti(m)(ϕM) = sup{p|Bpi (ϕ) ∈ D(m)},
so T ∗i (ω)([ϕ]) depends just on D(m) and is well-defined. By Remark 2, we have
Ti(m)(D
−1(·)) ∈ κ(,). 
LEMMA 5. There is a measurable function θ∗ : → S such that for every
κ-type space M on S for player set I and every m ∈ M :
θ∗(D(m)) = θ(m).
PROOF. Let
d0(m) := {E ∈ S |m ∈ θ−1(E)}.
Obviously, d0(m) = D(m) ∩ S . By the properties of (S,S), we have for all
s ∈ S : {s} = ⋂s∈E∈S E. It follows for every κ-type space M ′ on S for player
set I and m′ ∈ M ′ that
θ(m′) = s iff d0(m′) = {E|s ∈ E}.
For ω ∈  choose a κ-type space M on S for player set I and m ∈ M , such that
D(m) = ω. Define now θ∗(ω) := θ(m). Since θ(m) just depends on D(m), θ∗(ω)
is well-defined.
It remains to show that θ∗ is measurable: Let E ∈ S . We have
θ∗(D(m)) ∈ E iff m ∈ θ−1(E) iff E ∈ D(m) iff D(m) ∈ [E].
It follows that θ∗−1(E) = [E]. 
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PROPOSITION 4.
〈,, (T ∗i )i∈I , θ∗〉
is a κ-type space on S for player set I .
PROOF. It remains to show:
1. For every i ∈ I :T ∗i is measurable as a function from  to κ(,).
2. For every i ∈ I , ω ∈  and A ∈ : If
{ω′ ∈ |T ∗i (ω′) = T ∗i (ω)} ⊆ A,
then T ∗i (ω)(A) = 1.
1. Since inverse images commute with unions, intersections and complements,
it is enough to show that T ∗−1i (bp(E)) ∈ , for
bp(E) := {µ ∈ κ(,)|µ(E) ≥ p},
where E ∈  and p ∈ [0,1]. We have
T ∗−1i (b
p(E)) = {ω ∈ |T ∗i (ω)(E) ≥ p}.
Since E ∈ , there is a κ-expression ϕ such that E = [ϕ]. Note that if p ∈ [0,1]
and p = sup{q|Bqi (ϕ) ∈ ω}, then Bpi (ϕ) ∈ ω. This implies that
ω ∈ T ∗−1i (bp([ϕ])) iff Bpi (ϕ) ∈ ω.
It follows that T ∗−1i (bp(E)) = [Bpi (ϕ)].
2. Let ϕ be a κ-expression and
{ω′ ∈ |T ∗i (ω′) = T ∗i (ω)} ⊆ [ϕ].
Choose a κ-type space M on S for player set I and m ∈ M such that D(m) = ω.
Let m′ ∈ M . If T ∗i (D(m′)) 	= T ∗i (D(m)), then there is a κ-expression ψ such that
Ti(m
′)(ψM) 	= Ti(m)(ψM). It follows that
D
({m′ ∈ M|Ti(m′) = Ti(m)})⊆ {ω′ ∈ |T ∗i (ω′) = T ∗i (ω)},
which implies
{m′ ∈ M|Ti(m′) = Ti(m)} ⊆ D−1([ϕ]) = ϕM.
So we have
1 = Ti(m)(ϕM) = Ti(m)(D−1([ϕ])) = T ∗i (ω)([ϕ]). 
LEMMA 6. The κ-description map
D : → 
is the identity.
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PROOF. For ω ∈ , we have
ω = {ϕ ∈ |ω ∈ [ϕ]}.
We have to show that for every κ-expression ϕ and every ω ∈  :ω ∈ ϕ iff
ω ∈ [ϕ]. We know this already if ϕ = E, where E ∈ S . It is obvious that
 \ [ϕ] = [¬ϕ], and that if  is a nonempty set of κ-expressions of cardinal-
ity < κ , then
⋂
ϕ∈
[ϕ] =
[∧
ϕ∈
ϕ
]
.
So it remains to show that [ϕ] = ϕ implies [Bpi (ϕ)] = Bpi ([ϕ]). For ω ∈ ,
choose a κ-type space M on S for player set I and m ∈ M such that D(m) = ω.
We have
D(m) ∈ [Bpi (ϕ)] iff Bpi (ϕ) ∈ D(m) iff Ti(m)(ϕM) ≥ p.
But we have
T ∗i (ω)([ϕ]) = Ti(m)D−1([ϕ]) = Ti(m)(ϕM).
This implies that [Bpi (ϕ)] = Bpi ([ϕ]). 
THEOREM 1. The space
〈,, (T ∗i )i∈I , θ∗〉
is a universal κ-type space on S for player set I .
PROOF. According to Lemma 4, for every κ-type space M on S for player
set I , the κ-description map D :M →  is measurable, and according to Proposi-
tion 3 and Lemma 5, D is a type morphism. It remains to show that it is the unique
type morphism from M to . But this is clear by Proposition 2 and Lemma 6. 
5. Spaces of arbitrary complexity. Is there a cardinal κ , such that the
κ-descriptions determine already the κ ′-descriptions, for all cardinal numbers
κ ′ > κ? In the sequel, using a probabilistic adaptation of the elegant “sober-drunk”
example of Heifetz and Samet [9] (see that paper also for the “story” interpreting
the mathematical structure), we construct, for every regular cardinal κ ′, a κ ′-type
space (in fact even a ∗-type space), such that for every ordinal α < κ ′ there are at
least two states of the world such that for every κ ′-expression of depth ≤ α this
κ ′-expression is true either in both states or in neither of the two, and yet there
is a κ ′-expression of depth α + 1 that is true in one state and not in the other.
Thus, choosing α and κ ′ with κ ≤ α < α + 1 < κ ′, we answer the above question
in the negative. Hence, it makes sense to consider κ-type spaces for every regular
cardinality κ whatsoever.
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On top of that, this example will imply that, for at least two players and at least
two states of nature, there is no universal ∗-type space and no universal ∞-type
space (Theorem 4 and Corollary 1).
For this section, let I := {a, b} be the set of players (the following analysis can
be trivially extended to more than two players). We fix a set of states of nature
S = {h, t}, consisting of the two possible outcomes of tossing a coin, h(ead) and
t(ail).
To simplify the notation let us make the following
CONVENTION 2. {i, j} := {a, b}, that is,
j =
{
a, if i = b,
b, if i = a.
The following three definitions and Definition 19 are taken from Heifetz and
Samet [9].
DEFINITION 14. Let α ≥ 1 be an ordinal. A record of length α is a se-
quence rα = (r(β))β<α of numbers “0” and “1” such that for every limit ordinal
λ ≤ α there is an ordinal γ < λ such that r(β) = 0 for all ordinals β that satisfy
γ ≤ β < λ.
For every infinite ordinal γ there are a unique natural number n and a unique
limit ordinal λ̂ such that γ = λ̂+ n. We say γ is even or odd according to whether
n is even or odd. If γ is a finite ordinal, that is, a natural number, we take the usual
notion of being even or odd.
DEFINITION 15. Let α be an ordinal, rα a record of length α and λ a limit
ordinal ≤ α. By the definition of a record, there is a minimal ordinal oλ(rα) < λ
such that rα(β) = 0, for all β with oλ(rα) ≤ β < λ.
Define λ− par(rα), the λ-parity of rα , as
λ− par(rα) :=
{
even, if oλ(rα) is even,
odd, if oλ(rα) is odd.
Note that by the definition of a record, oλ(rα) must be either 0 or a successor
ordinal [i.e., oλ(rα) = γ + 1, for some ordinal γ ].
DEFINITION 16. Let α be an ordinal. Define the spaces Wα by:
(i) W 0 := {h, t},
(ii) Wα := {(w0,wαa ,wαb )|w0 ∈ {h, t},wαa and wαb are records of length α}, if
α ≥ 1.
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DEFINITION 17. (i) If 0 < β ≤ α and rα = (r(ξ))ξ<α is a record of length α,
then denote by rαβ the record (r(ξ))ξ<β of length β .
(ii) If 0 ≤ α and wα ∈ Wα , then define wα0 := w0.
(iii) If 0 < β ≤ α and wα ∈ Wα , then define wαβ := (w0,wαa β,wαb β).
By the definition, it is obvious that wαβ ∈ Wβ , for every β < α.
DEFINITION 18. Let 0 ≤ β ≤ α. Define
πβ,α :W
α → Wβ
by πβ,α(wα) := wαβ .
It is obvious that πξ,β(πβ,α(wα)) = πξ,α(wα), for 0 ≤ ξ ≤ β ≤ α.
REMARK 7. Let 0 ≤ β < α, wβ ∈ Wβ , and i ∈ {a, b}. Then there are wα ,
uα ∈ Wα such that
wαβ = uαβ = wβ and 0 = wαi (β) 	= uαi (β) = 1.
In particular, it follows that πβ,α :Wα → Wβ is onto.
We define for each player i a partition of the space Wα . Two states are in the
same element of player i’s partition if he cannot distinguish them. That is, he has
the same information (the same beliefs) in both states. Let wα = (w0,wαa ,wαb ) be
a state in Wα . The element of i’s partition that contains this state is defined as
follows:
DEFINITION 19. Let α be an ordinal > 0 and wα ∈ Wα . We define:
Pi(w
α) := {(v0, vαa , vαb ) ∈ Wα|vαi = wαi ,
wαi (0) = 1 implies v0 = w0,
for all β such that β + 1 < α :
wαi (β + 1) = 1 implies vαj (β) = wαj (β),
for every limit ordinal λ < α :
wαi (λ) = 1 implies λ− par(vαj ) = λ− par(wαj )}.
REMARK 8. (i) Let α be an ordinal > 0. The set {Pi(wα)|wα ∈ Wα} is a
partition of Wα and wα ∈ Pi(wα).
(ii) Let 0 < β < α and uα ∈ Pi(wα). Then uαβ ∈ Pi(wαβ), and hence
π−1β,α(Pi(wαβ)) ⊇ Pi(wα).
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It is easy to see that if α is an infinite ordinal number, then the cardinality of
Wα is the same as the cardinality of α. [To see that, in the case of an infinite α,
the cardinality of Wα does not exceed that of α, note that the definition of a record
implies that there are only finitely many β < α such that rα(β) = 1. Consider,
assuming the contrary, the minimal γ ≤ α such that there are infinitely many β < γ
with rα(β) = 1.] Therefore, we have:
REMARK 9. Let κ be an infinite cardinal number. Then |Wκ | = κ .
NOTATION 2. (a) For 0 ≤ α and w0 ∈ {h, t}, we denote by [Xα0 = w0] the set{uα ∈ Wα|u0 = w0}.
(b) For β < α, i ∈ {a, b} and wαi (β) ∈ {0,1}, we denote by [Xαi (β) =
wαi (β)] the set {uα ∈ Wα|uαi (β) = wαi (β)}.
(c) For a limit ordinal λ ≤ α and λ − par(wαi ) ∈ {even, odd}, we denote by[λ− par(Xαi ) = λ− par(wαi )] the set {uα ∈ Wα|λ− par(uαi ) = λ− par(wαi )}.
REMARK 10. Let 0 ≤ α ≤ γ and w0 ∈ {h, t}. Then:
(i) π−1α,γ ([Xα0 = w0]) = [Xγ0 = w0].
(ii) If β < α, i ∈ {a, b} and wγ ∈ Wγ , then
w
γ
i (β) = (wγi α)(β)
and
π−1α,γ
([Xαi (β) = (wγi α)(β)])= [Xγi (β) = wγi (β)].
(iii) If i ∈ {a, b}, wγ ∈ Wγ , and if λ is a limit ordinal such that λ ≤ α, then
λ− par(wγi ) = λ− par(wγi α)
and
π−1α,γ
([λ− par(Xαi ) = λ− par(wγi α)])= [λ− par(Xγi ) = λ− par(wγi )].
Now, let κ be a fixed regular cardinal.
THEOREM 2. For i ∈ {a, b}, there is a function Ti :Wκ −→ (Wκ,Pow(Wκ))
with the following properties:
(a) Ti(uκ) = Ti(wκ), for uκ ∈ Pi(wκ),
(b) Ti(wκ)(Pi(wκ)) = 1,
(c) Ti(wκ)([Xκ0 = w0]) =
{1, if wκi (0) = 1,
1
2 , if wκi (0) = 0,(d) for β < κ :
Ti(w
κ)
([Xκj (β) = wκj (β)])= {1, if wκi (β + 1) = 1,1
2 , if wκi (β + 1) = 0,
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(e) for λ < κ such that λ is a limit ordinal:
Ti(w
κ)
([λ− par(Xκj ) = λ− par(wκj )])= {1, if wκi (λ) = 1,1
2 , if wκi (λ) = 0,
(f ) for 0 ≤ β < α < κ and uκ,wκ ∈ Wκ : if Eβ ⊆ Wβ and uκα = wκα, then
Ti(u
κ)(π−1β,κ(E
β)) = Ti(wκ)(π−1β,κ(Eβ)).
Theorem 2 will be proved in Section 6.
REMARK 11. For wκ ∈ Wκ , define
θ(wκ) := w0.
From the first two points of Theorem 2 and the fact that Ti(wκ) is a finitely additive
probability measure defined on (Wκ,Pow(Wκ)), it follows that〈
Wκ, (Ti)i∈{a,b}, θ
〉
is a ∗-type space on S = {h, t} for player set {a, b}.
Next, by induction on the formation of κ-expressions, we define the depth of a
κ-expression. The depth of a κ-expression is an ordinal number that measures how
complex that expression is with respect to the players’ beliefs operators.
DEFINITION 20. (i) If E ∈ S , then dp(E) := 0,
(ii) if 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, i ∈ I and if ϕ is a κ-expression, then
dp(Bpi (ϕ)) := dp(ϕ)+ 1,
(iii) if ϕ is a κ-expression, then dp(¬ϕ) := dp(ϕ),
(iv) if  is a set of κ-expressions such that || < κ , then
dp
(∧
ϕ∈
ϕ
)
:= sup{dp(ϕ)|ϕ ∈ }.
It is easy to see that, since κ is regular, the depth of a κ-expression is always
strictly smaller than κ .
The following Lemmas 7–9 will be proved in the Appendix.
LEMMA 7. Let α ≤ κ , wκ,uκ ∈ Wκ and wκα = uκα.
Then, for all κ-expressions ϕ such that dp(ϕ) ≤ α:
wκ ∈ ϕWκ iff uκ ∈ ϕWκ .
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LEMMA 8. In the ∗-type space 〈Wκ, (Ti)i∈{a,b}, θ〉, we have:
[Xκi (0) = 1] = B1i ([Xκ0 = h])∪B1i ([Xκ0 = t]),
[Xκi (β + 1) = 1] = B1i
([Xκj (β) = 1])∪B1i ([Xκj (β) = 0])
for all ordinals β < κ,
[Xκi (λ) = 1] = B1i
([λ− par(Xκj ) = even])∪B1i ([λ− par(Xκj ) = odd])
for all limit ordinals λ < κ.
LEMMA 9. In the ∗-type space 〈Wκ, (Ti)i∈{a,b}, θ〉, we have:
(i)
{h}Wκ = [Xκ0 = h],
{t}Wκ = [Xκ0 = t],
dp({h}) = dp({t}) = 0.
(ii) For every i ∈ {a, b} and β such that 0 ≤ β < κ , there are κ-expressions
ϕ0i (β) and ϕ1i (β) with
dp(ϕ0i (β)) = dp(ϕ1i (β)) = β + 1
such that
(ϕ1i (β))
Wκ = [Xκi (β) = 1]
and
(ϕ0i (β))
Wκ = [Xκi (β) = 0].
(iii) For every i ∈ {a, b} and limit ordinal λ < κ , there are κ-expressions
ϕeveni (λ) and ϕoddi (λ) with
dp(ϕeveni (λ)) = dp(ϕoddi (λ)) = λ
such that
(ϕeveni (λ))
Wκ = [λ− par(Xκi ) = even]
and
(ϕoddi (λ))
Wκ = [λ− par(Xκi ) = odd].
THEOREM 3. For every ordinal α < κ there are uκ,wκ ∈ Wκ such that:
1. For all κ-expressions ϕ with dp(ϕ) ≤ α:
uκ ∈ ϕWκ iff wκ ∈ ϕWκ .
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2. There is a κ-expression ψ with dp(ψ) = α + 1 such that
uκ ∈ ψWκ and wκ ∈ (¬ψ)Wκ .
PROOF. Let α < κ and i ∈ {a, b}. By the definition of Wκ , there are uκ ,
wκ ∈ Wκ such that uκα = wκα and 1 = uκi (α) 	= wκi (α) = 0. The first point
follows now by Lemma 7. By Lemma 9, it follows that uκ ∈ ϕ1i (α)W
κ
, wκ ∈
(¬ϕ1i (α))W
κ
, and dp(ϕ1i (α)) = α + 1. 
Note that Lemma 7 and the proof of Theorem 3 show that u0 and the levels up
to and including level α of uκi and of uκj determine which of the κ-expressions of
depth α + 1 belong to the κ-description of uκ .
THEOREM 4. Let |I | ≥ 2 and |S| ≥ 2. Then, there is no weak-universal
∞-type space on S for player set I and there is no weak-universal ∗-type space
on S for player set I .
PROOF. Assume there is a weak-universal ∞-type space (a weak-universal
∗-type space, resp.)
U = 〈U,, (T Ui )i∈I , θU 〉
on S for player set I . Then, the underlying set U has a cardinality |U |. There is a
regular cardinal number κ > |U |.
Wκ = 〈Wκ, (Ti)i∈{a,b}, θ 〉
is a ∗-type space on {h, t} (and therefore a ∞-type space). Since |{h, t}| = 2, we
can assume without loss of generality that {h, t} ⊆ S, and since S = Pow(S), that
S ⊇ Pow({h, t}). Also, since |I | ≥ 2, we can assume without loss of generality
that {a, b} ⊆ I . For i ∈ I \ {a, b} define Ti(wκ) := δwκ , and view θ as a function
from Wκ to S. Then
WκI := 〈Wκ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉
is a ∗-type space on S (with player set I ). Since every ∗-type space is a ∞-type
space, WκI is also a ∞-type space. According to the assumption, there is a type
morphism f :Wκ → U . Since both spaces are in particular κ-type spaces, this
morphism preserves κ-descriptions. If ϕ is a κ-expression in the “language” cor-
responding to the set of states of nature {h, t} and the player set {a, b}, then ϕ is
also a κ-expression in the “language” corresponding to the set of states of na-
ture S and the player set I , and it is easy to check that for wκ ∈ Wκ we have
wκ ∈ ϕWκI iff wκ ∈ ϕWκ . So, by Lemma 9, it is still the case that two different
states of WκI have different κ-descriptions. Hence, since by Proposition 2, f pre-
serves κ-descriptions, f is one-to-one. It follows that |U | ≥ |Wκ | = κ , which is a
contradiction to |U | < κ . 
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COROLLARY 1. Let |I | ≥ 2 and |S| ≥ 2. Then there is no universal ∞-type
space on S for player set I and there is no universal ∗-type space on S for player
set I .
6. Construction of the Ti ’s. This section is devoted to the proof of Theo-
rem 2, that is, the construction of the Ti ’s mentioned there. Lemmas 10 and 12–17
needed for this construction are proved at the end of this section.
The construction will not be carried out at once. By a transfinite induction on
1 ≤ α ≤ κ , we endow Wα with fields F (i,wα) and finitely additive probability
measures T αi (w
α) on (Wα,F (i,wα)) such that the following Induction hypothesis
is satisfied:
INDUCTION HYPOTHESIS (for α).
1. F (i,wα) := [⋃β<α(π−1β,α(Pow(Wβ))),Pi(wα)].
2. For every ordinal β with 1 ≤ β < α and every Eβ ∈F (i,wαβ):
T αi (w
α)(π−1β,α(E
β)) = T βi (wαβ)(Eβ),
that is, marg(Wβ,F (i,wαβ)) T αi (wα) = T βi (wαβ).
3. T αi (wα) = T αi (uα) for uα ∈ Pi(wα).
4. T αi (wα)(Pi(wα)) = 1.
5. T αi (wα)([Xα0 = w0]) =
{1, if wαi (0) = 1,
1
2 , if w
α
i (0) = 0.
6. For β such that β + 1 < α:
T αi (w
α)
([Xαj (β) = wαj (β)])= {1, if wαi (β + 1) = 1,1
2 , if w
α
i (β + 1) = 0.
7. For λ < α such that λ is a limit ordinal:
T αi (w
α)
([λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(wαj )])= {1, if wαi (λ) = 1,1
2 , if w
α
i (λ) = 0.
Let 1 ≤ γ ≤ α. Then ⋃β<γ π−1β,α(Pow(Wβ)) is a field on Wα . Hence, by defini-
tion, F (i,wα) is also a field on Wα . Since inverse images commute with comple-
ments, arbitrary unions and intersections, we have:
REMARK 12. Let 1 ≤ γ ≤ α. Then,
π−1γ,α(F (i,wγ )) =
[⋃
β<γ
π−1β,α(Pow(W
β)),π−1γ,α(Pi(wγ ))
]
is a field on Wα . In particular,
π−1β+1,α
(
F (i,wαβ + 1))= [π−1β,α(Pow(Wβ)),π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1))]
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is a field on Wα , for β + 1 ≤ α. Note also that π−1γ,α(F (i,wαγ )) ⊆F (i,wα), for
1 ≤ γ ≤ α.
REMARK 13. Let 1 ≤ β ≤ α ≤ κ and let uα,wα ∈ Wα such that uα ∈ Pi(wα)
[and hence Pi(uα) = Pi(wα)]. Then:
(a) We have
F (i,wα) = F (i, uα),
F (i,wαβ) = F (i, uαβ).
(b) If
T αi (w
α) = T αi (uα),
T
β
i (w
αβ) = T βi (uαβ),
marg(Wβ,F (i,wαβ)) T αi (wα) = T βi (wαβ),
then we obviously also have
marg(Wβ,F (i,uαβ)) T αi (uα) = T βi (uαβ).
Before we begin the construction of the Ti’s, we have to provide some lemmas
that are needed to carry out this construction. These lemmas will guarantee that the
induction can be done maintaining the conditions 1–7 of the Induction hypothesis.
They will be proved at the end of this section.
LEMMA 10. Let γ be an ordinal > 0, α = γ + 1, wα ∈ Wα , and
E ∈
[[⋃
β<γ
π−1β,α(Pow(W
β)),π−1γ,α
(
Pi(w
αγ ))],Pi(wα)
]
.
Then there are a β < γ and Aβ,Cβ,Dβ ∈ Pow(Wβ) such that
E = (π−1β,α(Aβ)∩ Pi(wα))∪ (π−1β,α(Cβ)∩ π−1γ,α(Pi(wαγ ))∩ (Wα \ Pi(wα)))
∪ (π−1β,α(Dβ)∩ (Wα \ π−1γ,α(Pi(wαγ )))).
For further reference, we cite here (in a slightly changed formulation and in our
notation) Lemma 3.2 of [9]:
LEMMA 11. Let vα,wα ∈ Wα , where vαγ + 1 ∈ Pi(wαγ + 1), for some
γ < α. Then there is a uα ∈ Pi(wα) such that uαγ = vαγ .
LEMMA 12. Let λ be a limit ordinal, α = λ + 1, wα ∈ Wα , wαi (λ) = 0 and
E = π−1β,α(Eβ), where Eβ ⊆ Wβ for a β < λ. Then:
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(a) If vα ∈ E ∩ Pi(wα), then there is a uα ∈ E ∩ Pi(wα) such that
λ− par(uαj ) 	= λ− par(vαj ).
(b) If vα ∈ E ∩ π−1λ,α(Pi(wαλ)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi(wα)), then there is a uα ∈ E ∩
π−1λ,α(Pi(wαλ))∩ (Wα \ Pi(wα)) such that λ− par(uαj ) 	= λ− par(vαj ).
(c) If vα ∈ E ∩ (Wα \ π−1λ,α(Pi(wαλ))), then there is a uα ∈ E ∩ (Wα \
π−1λ,α(Pi(wαλ))) such that λ− par(uαj ) 	= λ− par(vαj ).
LEMMA 13. Let β be an ordinal, α = (β + 1)+ 1, wα ∈ Wα , wαi (β + 1) = 0
and E = π−1β,α(Eβ), such that Eβ ⊆ Wβ . Then:
(a) If vα ∈ E ∩ Pi(wα), then there is a uα ∈ E ∩ Pi(wα) such that uαj (β) 	=
vαj (β).
(b) If vα ∈ E ∩ π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi(wα)), then there is a uα ∈
E ∩ π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1))∩ (Wα \ Pi(wα)) such that uαj (β) 	= vαj (β).
(c) If vα ∈ E ∩ (Wα \π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1))), then there is a uα ∈ E ∩ (Wα \
π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1))) such that uαj (β) 	= vαj (β).
LEMMA 14. Let λ be a limit ordinal, α = λ+ 1, wα ∈ Wα , wαi (λ) = 0 and
E ∈
[[⋃
β<λ
π−1β,α(Pow(W
β)),π−1λ,α
(
Pi(w
αλ))],Pi(wα)
]
.
Then:
(a) If vα ∈ E, then there is a uα ∈ E such that λ− par(uαj ) 	= λ− par(vαj ).
(b) If vα ∈ Wα \ E, then there is a uα ∈ Wα \ E such that λ − par(uαj ) 	=
λ− par(vαj ).
(c) If E ⊇ [λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(wαj )], then E = Wα .
(d) If E ⊆ [λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(wαj )], then E = ∅.
LEMMA 15. Let β be an ordinal, α = (β + 1)+ 1, wα ∈ Wα , wαi (β + 1) = 0
and
E ∈ [[π−1β,α(Pow(Wβ)),π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1))],Pi(wα)].
Then:
(a) If vα ∈ E, then there is a uα ∈ E such that uαj (β) 	= vαj (β).
(b) If vα ∈ Wα \E, then there is a uα ∈ Wα \E such that uαj (β) 	= vαj (β).
(c) If E ⊇ [Xαj (β) = wαj (β)], then E = Wα .
(d) If E ⊆ [Xαj (β) = wαj (β)], then E = ∅.
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LEMMA 16. Let γ be an ordinal > 0, α = γ + 1, wα ∈ Wα and
E ∈
[⋃
β<γ
π−1β,α(Pow(W
β)),π−1γ,α
(
Pi(w
αγ ))]
such that E ⊇ Pi(wα). Then
E ⊇ π−1γ,α
(
Pi(w
αγ )).
LEMMA 17. Let λ be a limit ordinal, wλ ∈ Wλ, β < λ and Eβ ⊆ Wβ such
that π−1β,λ(Eβ) ⊇ Pi(wλ). Then π−1β,λ(Eβ) ⊇ π−1β+1,λ(Pi(wλβ + 1)).
PROOF OF THEOREM 2. We construct the Ti’s by transfinite induction on 1 ≤
α ≤ κ , such that the conditions 1–7 of the Induction hypothesis at the beginning of
this section are satisfied:
Step α = 1. We have W 0 = {h, t}. Let w1 ∈ W 1. Define
T <1i (w
1)([X10 = w0]) :=
{
1, if w1i (0) = 1,
1
2 , if w
1
i (0) = 0,
T <1i (w
1)([X10 	= w0]) := 1 − T <1i (w1)([X10 = w0]),
T <1i (w
1)(∅) := 0,
T <1i (w
1)(W 1) := 1.
It is clear that by this definition, T <1i (w1) is a probability measure on(
W 1, π−10,1(Pow(W
0))
)
.
Let E0 ⊆ W 0 such that Pi(w1) ⊆ π−10,1(E0).
1. Case: w1i (0) = 1. Then E0 = W 0 or E0 = [X00 = w0], hence the outer measure
T <1i (w
1)∗(Pi(w1)) is equal to 1.
2. Case: w1i (0) = 0. Then E0 = W 0 and the outer measure T <1i (w1)∗(Pi(w1)) is
equal to 1.
For u1 ∈ Pi(w1), we have in both cases that Pi(u1) = Pi(w1) and T <1i (u1) =
T <1i (w
1). For each Pi(u1) such that u1 ∈ W 1, choose a representing element w1 ∈
Pi(u
1) = Pi(w1). By the Łos´–Marczewski theorem, we can extend T <1i (w1) to a
finitely additive probability measure T 1i (w1) on the field
F (i,w1) = [π−10,1(Pow(W 0)),Pi(w1)]
such that T 1i (w1)(Pi(w1)) = 1. Define T 1i (u1) := T 1i (w1), for all u1 ∈ Pi(w1).
Note that F (i, u1) = F (i,w1), for u1 ∈ Pi(w1). T 1i (u1) and F (i, u1) satisfy
the conditions 1–7 of the Induction hypothesis.
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Step α = (β + 1) + 1, for 0 ≤ β < κ . For each Pi(uα) such that uα ∈ Wα ,
choose a representing element wα ∈ Pi(uα) = Pi(wα).
Let T <αi (w
α) be the finitely additive probability measure defined on the field
π−1β+1,α
(
F (i,wαβ + 1))= [π−1β,α(Pow(Wβ)),π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1))],
which is induced by T β+1i (wαβ + 1) (as defined in Lemma 1). According
to Lemma 16 and the Induction hypothesis, we have for the outer measure of
Pi(w
α) :T <αi (w
α)∗(Pi(wα)) = 1. So, by the Łos´–Marczewski theorem, we can
extend T <αi (wα) to a finitely additive probability measure T˜ αi (wα) defined on the
field
F˜ (i,wα) := [[π−1β,α(Pow(Wβ)),π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1))],Pi(wα)]
such that T˜ αi (wα)(Pi(wα)) = 1.
1. Case: wαi (β + 1) = 1. Then
π−1β+1,α
([Xβ+1j (β) = (wαj β + 1)(β)])= [Xαj (β) = wαj (β)] ⊇ Pi(wα).
By Lemma 3, extend T˜ αi (wα) to a finitely additive probability measure T αi (wα)
on the field
[π−1β+1,α(Pow(Wβ+1)),Pi(wα)] =F (i,wα).
By the above, we have
T αi (w
α)
([Xαj (β) = wαj (β)])= 1.
Define now T αi (uα) := T αi (wα), for all uα ∈ Pi(wα). Note that, for uα ∈
Pi(w
α), we have F˜ (i, uα) = F˜ (i,wα), F (i, uα) =F (i,wα) and uαi (β + 1) =
wαi (β + 1) = 1 and hence, uαj (β) = wαj (β). It is now easy to check that T αi (uα)
and F (i, uα) satisfy the conditions 1–7 of the Induction hypothesis.
2. Case: wαi (β + 1) = 0. By Lemma 15 and the Induction hypothesis, we have for
the outer measure of [Xαj (β) = wαj (β)]:
T˜ αi (w
α)∗
([Xαj (β) = wαj (β)])= 1,
and for the inner measure
T˜ αi (w
α)∗
([Xαj (β) = wαj (β)])= 0.
By the Łos´–Marczewski theorem, we can extend T˜ αi (wα) to a finitely additive
probability measure T̂ αi (wα) on the field[
F˜ (i,wα), [Xαj (β) = wαj (β)]
]
such that
T̂ αi (w
α)
([Xαj (β) = wαj (β)])= 12 .
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Finally, by Lemma 3, extend T̂ αi (wα) to a finitely additive probability measure
T αi (w
α) on F (i,wα). Define now T αi (uα) := T αi (wα), for all uα ∈ Pi(wα). It
is easy to check that T αi (uα) and F (i, uα) satisfy the conditions 1–7 of the
Induction hypothesis.
Step α = λ, λ limit ordinal. For each Pi(uα) such that uα ∈ Wα , choose a
representing element wα ∈ Pi(uα) = Pi(wα).
Let T <αi (w
α) be the finitely additive probability measure defined on the field⋃
β<α
π−1β,α
(
F (i,wαβ))= ⋃
β<α
π−1β,α(Pow(W
β))
which is induced by (T βi (wαβ))1≤β<α (as defined in Lemma 1).
Let β < α and Eβ ⊆ Wβ such that π−1β,α(Eβ) ⊇ Pi(wα). By Lemma 17, we have
π−1β,α(E
β) ⊇ π−1β+1,α
(
Pi(w
αβ + 1)).
(Note that β < α implies β + 1 < α.) Since, by the definition of T <αi (wα),
T <αi (w
α)
(
π−1β+1,α
(
Pi(w
αβ + 1)))= T β+1i (wαβ + 1)(Pi(wαβ + 1))= 1,
the outer measure T <αi (wα)∗(Pi(wα)) is equal to 1. By the Łos´–Marczewski the-
orem, we can extend T <αi (wα) to a finitely additive probability measure T αi (wα)
on the field
F (i,wα) =
[⋃
β<α
π−1β,α(Pow(W
β)),Pi(w
α)
]
such that T αi (wα)(Pi(wα)) = 1. For uα ∈ Pi(wα) define T αi (uα) := T αi (wα). It is
easy to check that T αi (uα) and F (i, uα) satisfy the conditions 1–7 of the Induction
hypothesis.
Step α = λ+ 1, λ limit ordinal. For each Pi(uα) such that uα ∈ Wα , choose a
representing element wα ∈ Pi(uα) = Pi(wα).
Let T <αi (w
α) be the finitely additive probability measure defined on the field
π−1λ,α
(
F (i,wαλ))= [⋃
β<λ
π−1β,α(Pow(W
β)),π−1λ,α
(
Pi(w
αλ))],
which is induced by T λi (wαλ) (as defined in Lemma 1). According to Lemma 16
and the Induction hypothesis, we have for the outer measure of Pi(wα) :
T <αi (w
α)∗(Pi(wα)) = 1. So, by the Łos´–Marczewski theorem, we can extend
T <αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability measure T˜ αi (wα) defined on the field
F˜ (i,wα) :=
[[⋃
β<λ
π−1β,α(Pow(W
β)),π−1λ,α
(
Pi(w
αλ))],Pi(wα)
]
,
such that T˜ αi (wα)(Pi(wα)) = 1.
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1. Case: wαi (λ) = 1. Then
π−1λ,α
([λ− par(Xλj ) = λ− par(wαj λ)])= [λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(wαj )]
⊇ Pi(wα).
By Lemma 3, extend T˜ αi (wα) to a finitely additive probability measure T αi (wα)
on the field
[π−1λ,α(Pow(Wλ)),Pi(wα)] =F (i,wα).
By the above, we have
T αi (w
α)
([λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(wαj )])= 1.
Define now T αi (uα) := T αi (wα), for all uα ∈ Pi(wα). [Note that F (i, uα) =
F (i,wα), uαi (λ) = wαi (λ) = 1 and hence, λ − par(wαj ) = λ − par(uαj ).] It is
now easy to check that T αi (uα) and F (i, uα) satisfy the conditions 1–7 of the
Induction hypothesis.
2. Case: wαi (λ) = 0. By Lemma 14, we have for the outer measure of [λ −
par(Xαj ) = λ− par(wαj )]:
T˜ αi (w
α)∗
([λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(wαj )])= 1,
and for the inner measure
T˜ αi (w
α)∗
([λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(wαj )])= 0.
By the Łos´–Marczewski theorem, we can extend T˜ αi (wα) to a finitely additive
probability measure T̂ αi (wα) on the field[
F˜ (i,wα), [λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(wαj )]
]
such that
T̂ αi (w
α)
([λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(wαj )])= 12 .
Finally, by Lemma 3, extend T̂ αi (wα) to a finitely additive probability measure
T αi (w
α) on F (i,wα). Define now T αi (uα) := T αi (wα), for all uα ∈ Pi(wα). It
is easy to check that T αi (uα) and F (i, uα) satisfy the conditions 1–7 of the
Induction hypothesis.
Remaining step. To finish the proof of Theorem 2, we have to extend T κi (uκ)
to a finitely additive probability measure Ti(uκ) defined on the field Pow(Wκ)
such that Ti(uκ) = Ti(wκ), for uκ ∈ Pi(wκ).
By the inductive construction, T κi (uκ) is defined on[⋃
β<κ
π−1β,κ(Pow(W
β)),Pi(w
κ)
]
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such that the conditions 1–7 of the Induction hypothesis are satisfied for α = κ .
For each Pi(uκ) such that uκ ∈ Wκ , choose a representing element
wκ ∈ Pi(uκ) = Pi(wκ).
By Lemma 3, extend T κi (wκ) to a finitely additive probability measure Ti(wκ)
on the field Pow(Wκ) and define
Ti(u
κ) := Ti(wκ),
for uκ ∈ Pi(wκ). By construction and the Induction hypothesis for α = κ , the func-
tion Ti :Wκ → (Wκ,Pow(Wκ)) has all the desired properties, and hence Theo-
rem 2 is proved. 
6.1. Proofs of Lemmas 10 and 12–17.
PROOF OF LEMMA 10. By the definition of[[⋃
β<γ
π−1β,α(Pow(W
β)),π−1γ,α
(
Pi(w
αγ ))],Pi(wα)
]
,
E has the form
E = (((π−1β,α(Aβ)∩ π−1γ,α(Pi(wαγ )))
∪ (π−1η,α(Bη)∩ (Wα \ π−1γ,α(Pi(wαγ )))))∩ Pi(wα))
∪ (((π−1ξ,α(Cξ )∩ π−1γ,α(Pi(wαγ )))
∪ (π−1ζ,α(Dζ )∩ (Wα \ π−1γ,α(Pi(wαγ )))))∩ (Wα \ Pi(wα))),
where β,η, ξ, ζ < γ and Aβ ⊆ Wβ,Bη ⊆ Wη, Cξ ⊆ Wξ , Dζ ⊆ Wζ .
The lemma follows from the following facts: If η < β , then π−1η,β(Bη) ⊆ Wβ
and π−1η,α(Bη) = π−1β,α(π−1η,β(Bη)), so we can assume without loss of generality that
β = η = ξ = ζ . By Remark 8, we have Pi(wα) ⊆ π−1γ,α(Pi(wαγ )). 
PROOF OF LEMMA 12. Let vα ∈ E. Since β,oλ(vαi ), oλ(vαj ) < λ, there is an
ordinal ξ such that max{β,oλ(vαi ), oλ(vαj )} ≤ ξ < λ and such that the parity of
ξ + 1 is different from λ− par(vαj ). Define now uα ∈ Wα by
u0 := v0,
uαi := vαi ,
uαj (γ ) := vαj (γ ) for all γ < α with γ 	= ξ,
uαj (ξ) := 1.
It follows that λ−par(uαj ) 	= λ−par(vαj ) and uαβ = vαβ , which implies uα ∈ E.
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(a) If vα ∈ Pi(wα), then it is easy to check that uα ∈ Pi(vα) = Pi(wα).
(b) If vα ∈ π−1λ,α(Pi(wαλ)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi(wα)), then it follows that
vα ∈ π−1λ,α(Pi(wαλ)) and vαi (λ) = 1. It is again easy to check that uα ∈
π−1λ,α(Pi(vαλ)) = π−1λ,α(Pi(wαλ)) and since uαi (λ) = 1, we have uα ∈ (Wα \
Pi(w
α)).
(c) If vα /∈ π−1λ,α(Pi(wαλ)), then there are four cases:
1. vαi λ 	= wαi λ. From uαi λ = vαi λ it follows that uα /∈ π−1λ,α(Pi(wαλ)).
2. There is a γ < λ such that
(vαi λ)(γ + 1) = (wαi λ)(γ + 1) = 1 and (vαj λ)(γ ) 	= (wαj λ)(γ ).
Since γ + 1 < λ and max{β,oλ(vαi ), oλ(vαj )} > γ + 1, it follows that
uαγ + 2 = vαγ + 2 and therefore uα /∈ π−1λ,α(Pi(wαλ)).
3. There is a limit ordinal λ̂ < λ such that
(vαi λ)(̂λ) = (wαi λ)(̂λ) = 1 and λ̂− par(vαj ) 	= λ̂− par(wαj ).
We have ξ > λ̂, and therefore
(uαi λ)(̂λ) = (vαi λ)(̂λ) and λ̂− par(uαj ) = λ̂− par(vαj ).
It follows that uα /∈ π−1λ,α(Pi(wαλ)).
4. (vαi λ)(0) = (wαi λ)(0) = 1 and v0 	= w0. We have
(uαi λ)(0) = (vαi λ)(0) = 1 and u0 = v0.
It follows that uα /∈ π−1λ,α(Pi(wαλ)). 
PROOF OF LEMMA 13. Let vα ∈ E. Define uα ∈ Wα by
u0 := v0,
uαi := vαi ,
uαj (γ ) := vαj (γ ) for all γ < α with γ 	= β,
uαj (β) := 1 − vαj (β).
It follows that uαj (β) 	= vαj (β) and uαβ = vαβ , which implies uα ∈ E.
(a) If vα ∈ Pi(wα), then it is easy to check that uα ∈ Pi(vα) = Pi(wα).
(b) If vα ∈ π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi(wα)), then it follows that vα ∈
π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1)) and vαi (β + 1) = 1. It is again easy to check that uα ∈
π−1β+1,α(Pi(vαβ+1)) = π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ+1)) and since uαi (β+1) = 1, we have
uα ∈ (Wα \ Pi(wα)).
(c) If vα /∈ π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1)), then there are four cases:
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1. vαi β + 1 	= wαi β + 1. From uαi β + 1 = vαi β + 1, it follows that
uα /∈ π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1)).
2. There is a γ < β such that
(vαi β + 1)(γ + 1) = (wαi β + 1)(γ + 1) = 1
and
(vαj β + 1)(γ ) 	= (wαj β + 1)(γ ).
By the definition of uα , (uαi β + 1)(γ + 1) = 1 and, since γ < β ,
(vαj β + 1)(γ ) = (uαj β + 1)(γ ),
hence uα /∈ π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1)).
3. There is a limit ordinal λ < β + 1 such that
(vαi β+1)(λ) = (wαi β+1)(λ) = 1 and λ−par(vαj ) 	= λ−par(wαj ).
We have (uαi β+1)(λ) = 1 and, since λ ≤ β , λ−par(uαj ) = λ−par(vαj ).
It follows that uα /∈ π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1)).
4. (vαi β + 1)(0) = (wαi β + 1)(0) = 1 and v0 	= w0. We have
(uαi β + 1)(0) = (vαi β + 1)(0) = 1 and u0 = v0.
It follows that uα /∈ π−1β+1,α(Pi(wαβ + 1)). 
PROOF OF LEMMA 14. The first point of the lemma follows from Lemmas
10 and 12.
The second point follows from the first and the fact that[[⋃
β<λ
π−1β,α(Pow(W
β)),π−1λ,α
(
Pi(w
αλ))],Pi(wα)
]
is a field on Wα (and therefore it is closed under complements).
The last two points of the lemma follow directly from the first two points. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 15. Note that if α ≥ β + 1, then⋃
ξ<β+1
π−1ξ,α(Pow(W
ξ )) = π−1β,α(Pow(Wβ)).
The proof is now analogous to the proof of Lemma 14—just replace λ by β + 1
and Lemma 12 by Lemma 13. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 16. Since Pi(wα) ⊆ π−1γ,α(Pi(wαγ )), it follows from the
definition of [⋃
β<γ
π−1β,α(Pow(W
β)),π−1γ,α
(
Pi(w
αγ ))],
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that there is a β < γ and an Eβ ⊆ Wβ such that
E ∩ π−1γ,α
(
Pi(w
αγ ))= π−1β,α(Eβ)∩ π−1γ,α(Pi(wαγ ))⊇ Pi(wα).
Claim. π−1β,α(Eβ) ⊇ π−1γ,α(Pi(wαγ )).
Assume to the contrary, that there is a vα ∈ π−1γ,α(Pi(wαγ )) \ π−1β,α(Eβ). Since
β + 1 ≤ γ , we have vαβ + 1 ∈ Pi(wαβ + 1). By Lemma 11, there is a uα ∈
Pi(w
α) such that uαβ = vαβ . Since Eβ ⊆ Wβ and vα /∈ π−1β,α(Eβ), it follows
that uα /∈ π−1β,α(Eβ), a contradiction to π−1β,α(Eβ) ⊇ Pi(wα). 
PROOF OF LEMMA 17. Assume that there is a vλ ∈ π−1β+1,λ(Pi(wλβ + 1)) \
π−1β,λ(Eβ). By Lemma 11, there is a uλ ∈ Pi(wλ) such that uλβ = vλβ . Therefore
uλ /∈ π−1β,λ(Eβ), a contradiction to π−1β,λ(Eβ) ⊇ Pi(wλ). 
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 7. We prove the lemma by induction on the formation of
κ-expressions.
(a) Let ϕ = E, where E ∈ {h,t} = Pow({h, t}), and let wκ,uκ ∈ Wκ such that
wκ0 = uκ0. By definition, vκ ∈ EWκ iff θ(vκ) ∈ E, for vκ ∈ Wκ . But we have
θ(vκ) = v0 = vκ0, for vκ ∈ Wκ . It follows that uκ ∈ EWκ iff wκ ∈ EWκ .
(b) Let ϕ = ¬ψ such that depth(ϕ) ≤ α and let wκ,uκ ∈ Wκ such that wκα =
uκα. It follows that depth(ψ) ≤ α and uκ ∈ ϕWκ iff uκ /∈ ψWκ iff—by the induc-
tion assumption—wκ /∈ ψWκ , which is the case iff wκ ∈ ϕWκ .
(c) Let p ∈ [0,1], i ∈ {a, b}, ϕ = Bpi (ψ), dp(ψ)+ 1 = β + 1 ≤ α and wκ,uκ ∈
Wκ such that wκα = uκα. By the induction assumption, there is a Eβ ⊆ Wβ
such that ψWκ = π−1β,κ(Eβ). By Theorem 2 and Remark 11,
Ti(u
κ)
(
ψW
κ )= Ti(wκ)(ψWκ ).
It follows that uκ ∈ (Bpi (ψ))W
κ iff wκ ∈ (Bpi (ψ))W
κ
.
(d) Let || < κ , ϕ = ∧ψ∈ ψ such that depth(ϕ) ≤ α, and let wκ,uκ ∈ Wκ
such that wκα = uκα. Then depth(ψ) ≤ α, for ψ ∈  . By the induction assump-
tion, uκ ∈ ψWκ iff wκ ∈ ψWκ , for ψ ∈  . It follows that uκ ∈ ϕWκ iff wκ ∈ ϕWκ .

Lemma 8 follows directly from Theorem 2 and Remark 11.
PROOF OF LEMMA 9. The first point is clear. We show the second and the
third points by a transfinite induction on 0 ≤ β < κ .
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(a) β = 0. According to Lemma 8 and the first point of this lemma, we have
(ϕ1i (0))W
κ := (B1i ({h})∨B1i ({t}))Wκ = [Xκi (0) = 1]
and
(ϕ0i (0))W
κ := (¬(B1i ({h})∨B1i ({t})))Wκ = [Xκi (0) = 0].
And obviously, dp(ϕ0i (0)) = dp(ϕ1i (0)) = 1.
(b) β = γ + 1. According to the induction assumption, there are κ-expressions
ϕ0j (γ ) and ϕ1j (γ ) such that
(ϕ0j (γ ))
Wκ = [Xκj (γ ) = 0],
(ϕ1j (γ ))
Wκ = [Xκj (γ ) = 1],
dp(ϕ0j (γ )) = dp(ϕ1j (γ ))
= β.
Define
ϕ1i (β) := B1i (ϕ0j (γ ))∨B1i (ϕ1j (γ ))
and
ϕ0i (β) := ¬ϕ1i (β).
ϕ1i (β) and ϕ0i (β) are κ-expressions of depth β + 1. We have
[Xκi (β) = 0] = Wκ \ [Xκi (β) = 1].
By Lemma 8 and the induction assumption, it follows that
[Xκi (β) = 1] = (ϕ1i (β))W
κ
and
[Xκi (β) = 0] = (ϕ0i (β))W
κ
.
(c) Let λ < κ be a limit ordinal. For i ∈ {a, b} and β < λ define in Wκ :
[Yλi (β)] := [Xκi (β) = 1] ∩
⋂
β<α<λ
[Xκi (α) = 0],
[Zλi ] :=
⋂
0≤α<λ
[Xκi (α) = 0].
According to the induction assumption for α,β < λ and the fact that |λ| < κ , it
follows that
ψλi (β) := ϕ1i (β)∧
∧
β<α<λ
ϕ0i (α)
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and
χλi :=
∧
0≤α<λ
ϕ0i (α)
are κ-expressions such that
dp(ψλi (β)) = max
{
β + 1, sup{dp(ϕ0i (α))|β < α < λ}
}
= sup{α + 1|α < λ}
= λ,
and, similarly, dp(χλi ) = λ.
It follows from the induction assumption that
[Yλi (β)] = (ψλi (β))W
κ
and [Zλi ] = (χλi )W
κ
.
Since oλ(wκi ), for wκi ∈ Wκi , can never be a limit ordinal, we have
[λ− par(Xκi ) = even] = [Zλi ] ∪
⋃
β<λ,β odd
[Yλi (β)]
and
[λ− par(Xκi ) = odd] =
⋃
β<λ,β even
[Yλi (β)].
Again, since |λ| < κ , it follows from the above that
ϕeveni (λ) := χλi ∨
∨
β<λ,β odd
ψλi (β)
and
ϕoddi (λ) :=
∨
β<λ,β even
ψλi (β)
are κ-expressions such that
dp(ϕeveni (λ)) = max
{
dp(χλi ), sup{dp(ψλi (β))|β < λ,β odd}
}= λ,
and
dp(ϕoddi (λ)) = λ.
By the definitions and the induction assumption, we have
(ϕeveni (λ))
Wκ = [λ− par(Xκi ) = even]
and
(ϕoddi (λ))
Wκ = [λ− par(Xκi ) = odd].
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(d) β = λ, λ limit ordinal < κ . By Lemma 8 and the above we have
(ϕ1i (λ))
Wκ := (B1i (ϕevenj (λ))∨B1i (ϕoddj (λ)))Wκ = [Xκi (λ) = 1],
(ϕ0i (λ))
Wκ := (¬(B1i (ϕevenj (λ))∨B1i (ϕoddj (λ))))Wκ = [Xκi (λ) = 0]
and
dp
(
B1i (ϕ
even
j (λ))∨B1i (ϕoddj (λ))
)Wκ
= dp(¬(B1i (ϕevenj (λ))∨B1i (ϕoddj (λ))))Wκ
= λ+ 1. 
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